Concerns with SUAVE's effect on Ethereum security and total value extracted

[apriori]

@nikete

Clearly the part of value that a validator can find building themselves is hopeless, yet to the extent that the chain value proposition is to provide a permisionless coordination mechanism, it seems like they might eventually use it to credibly coordinate to extract the part of the value that the validators can’t see without the builders.

I like this line of thinking.

2 ideas:

• Better default algorithm for local block production that could get very close to the MEV in a builder’s block
• MEV Oracle which could estimate within some band +/- 1% amount of MEV available in a particular slot

The idea being that if the proposer knows the amount of MEV that is available before their deadline to commit to a builder’s bid they can always end the auction and fall back to the local block. This would keep builders honest with their bids because the proposer could always refuse to accept an artificially low bid. The reputation of low-ball bid builders would provide enough social collateral to keep them honest.