# The MEV Letter #0
**URL:** https://collective.flashbots.net/t/the-mev-letter-0/1967
**Category:** The Flashbots Ship
**Tags:** links, the-mev-letter
**Created:** [July 7, 2023, 5:58pm UTC](https://collective.flashbots.net/t/the-mev-letter-0/1967 "2023-07-07T17:58:48Z")
**Posts on this page:** 3
**Page:** 1
### Author:  [@Fred](https://collective.flashbots.net/u/Fred)
#### Post date: [July 7, 2023, 5:58pm UTC](https://collective.flashbots.net/t/the-mev-letter-0/1967/1 "2023-07-07T17:58:48Z")
Welcome to the first edition of _The MEV Letter_ - a collection of papers, articles, events, and resources related to MEV. This list has previously been included at the end of the bi/monthly[Transparency Reports](https://collective.flashbots.net/tag/transparency-report), but will from now on be published separately in this letter. The Transparency Reports will continue to be published with updates related to Flashbots data, products, and research. Enjoy!
## Papers & Articles
- [Towards Optimal Prior-Free Permissionless Rebate Mechanisms, with applications to Automated Market Makers & Combinatorial Orderflow Auctions](https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.17024) by[Bruno Mazorra](https://twitter.com/0xBrMazoRoig),[Nicolás Della Penna](https://twitter.com/nikete) explores the impact of MEV on users, discusses the Shapley value as a solution for fair compensation, and delves into the mechanisms of MEV rebates and auctions as a means to undermine the power of block builders.
- [When Bidders Are DAOs](https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.17099v1) by[Pranav Garimidi](https://twitter.com/PGarimidi),[Maryam Bahrani](https://twitter.com/bahrani_maryam) and[Tim Roughgarden](https://twitter.com/Tim_Roughgarden) studies auctions in which the participants are groups of bidders pooling resources, rather than individuals.
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/PGarimidi/status/1674824550729625600?t=GRIM_Yryy_serUdYQiU77g&s=19) by[Pranav Garimidi](https://twitter.com/PGarimidi)
- [Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers](https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.01686) by[Pranav Garimidi](https://twitter.com/PGarimidi),[Maryam Bahrani](https://twitter.com/bahrani_maryam) and[Tim Roughgarden](https://twitter.com/Tim_Roughgarden) introduces a model of active block producers and show that transaction fee mechanism designs such as EIP1559 is fundamentally more difficult with active block producers than with passive ones.
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/Tim_Roughgarden/status/1676980165316886530) by [Tim Roughgarden](https://twitter.com/Tim_Roughgarden)
- [Arbitrageurs’ profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response](https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.02074) by [Andrea Canidio](https://twitter.com/AndreaCanidio) and[Robin Fritsch](https://twitter.com/robin_ethz) discusses an function maximizing AMM model where all trades are batched and executed at the marginal price, ensuring fair, equilibrium prices due to arbitrageur competition and eliminating sandwich attacks.
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/AndreaCanidio/status/1676858841277906944?t=Vi14N06avrDfcYeNzhItog&s=19) by [Andrea Canidio](https://twitter.com/AndreaCanidio)
- [The Pricing And Hedging Of Constant Function Market Makers](https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.11580) by[Richard Dewey](https://twitter.com/richdewey)[and Craig Newbold](https://arxiv.org/search/cs?searchtype=author&query=Newbold%2C+C) presents a model for valuing liquidity provider mechanisms in CFMMs and estimating the value of the associated derivatives.
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/ProvenTools/status/1675865832386117633?t=fjHn7Bwgq5Xf19q8Pbu-Og&s=19) by[Proven](https://twitter.com/ProvenTools)
- [Analyzing Geospatial Distribution in Blockchains](https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.17771) by[Shashank Motepalli](https://arxiv.org/search/cs?searchtype=author&query=Motepalli%2C+S) and[Hans-Arno Jacobsen](https://arxiv.org/search/cs?searchtype=author&query=Jacobsen%2C+H) looks at the geospatial diversity of validators in Ethereum and introduces GeoDec, an emulator to measure the interplay between a validator’s location and performance.
- [Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions](https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13321) by[Elijah Fox](https://twitter.com/PossibltyResult),[Mallesh Pai](https://twitter.com/malleshpai) and[Max Resnick](https://twitter.com/MaxResnick1/) explores a new definition of censorship resistance as “the amount it would cost the adversary to censor a transaction for a fixed interval of time as a function of the associated tip”.
- [Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4hA47S4d9A) presentation by[Max Resnick](https://twitter.com/MaxResnick1/) at the[MEV [re]search-athon](https://collective.flashbots.net/t/flashbots-at-ethdenver/1364) at ETHDenver 2023
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/MaxResnick1/status/1673433002339352592?s=20) by[Mas Resnick](https://twitter.com/MaxResnick1)
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/specialmech/status/1674482046826328065) by[SMG](https://twitter.com/specialmech)
- Follow up[tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/specialmech/status/1674853187260657665?t=3BphFlPGaTen_bC7S2TfMQ&s=19) by[SMG](https://twitter.com/specialmech)
- [Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing](https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.06046) by[Jason Milionis](https://twitter.com/jason_of_cs),[Ciamac C. Moallemi](https://twitter.com/ciamac),[Tim Roughgarden](https://twitter.com/Tim_Roughgarden),[Anthony Lee Zhang](https://twitter.com/AnthonyLeeZhang) is an updated version of the paper examining constant function market makers (CFMMs) from the viewpoint of passive liquidity providers. The revision includes an empirical study measuring the Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (LVR) for the Uniswap v2 WETH-USDC pair.
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/AnthonyLeeZhang/status/1673701349379264512) by[Anthony Lee Zhang](https://twitter.com/AnthonyLeeZhang)
- [Payload-timeliness committee (PTC) – an ePBS design](https://ethresear.ch/t/payload-timeliness-committee-ptc-an-epbs-design/16054) by [Mike Neuder](https://twitter.com/mikeneuder) and [Francesco](https://twitter.com/fradamt) presents a new design for ePBS called Payload-Timeliness Committee (PTC). The design outlines a new slot anatomy, block production, and honest attesting behavior.
- [Opportunities and Considerations of Ethereum’s Blockspace Future](https://frontier.tech/ethereums-blockspace-future) by [Drew Van der Werff](https://twitter.com/DrewVdW) and [Alex Matthews](https://twitter.com/alexmatthews95) explore the design space for blockspace derivatives and selling future blockspace, including how these markets may strengthen price discovery of gas.
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/DrewVdW/status/1676956606779777024?s=20) by [Drew Van der Werff](https://twitter.com/DrewVdW)
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/alexmatthews95/status/1676958662785646593) by [Alex Matthews](https://twitter.com/alexmatthews95)
- [Arbitrage loss and how to fix it](https://www.propellerheads.xyz/blog/fix-amm-arbitrage-loss-lvr) by[Markus Schmitt](https://twitter.com/_haikane_) identifies three ways AMMs lose value to arbitrage: stale prices, backrunning, and DEX-DEX gains. The post suggests that LPs can capture these losses by implementing asymmetric and dynamic fees, which adjust based on the distance to the market price.
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/_haikane_/status/1674899226029957122?t=XpwT90iS3zeYfQFlD8eSag&s=19) by[Markus Schmitt](https://twitter.com/_haikane_)
- [The Myth of Good Arbitrage](https://www.propellerheads.xyz/blog/the-myth-of-good-arbitrage) by[Markus Schmitt](https://twitter.com/_haikane_) challenges the common belief that arbitrage is necessary for market efficiency and argues that arbitrage is a net loss in DeFi, suggesting that it drains liquidity and hinders DeFi’s competitiveness.
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/_haikane_/status/1676985993088385027?t=t6OVmPV21cl8-aniG0wjnQ&s=19) by[Markus Schmitt](https://twitter.com/_haikane_)
- [Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) and Enshrined/in-protocol PBS in Ethereum](https://mirror.xyz/0x55a0c204c6fDd0DCf238430cb4BF79D45e8D9Bc3/kw_7qbkOl4NV1pmpRgVwtsS-7TZff_zTmmNEOm2BbmU) by[YQ](https://twitter.com/jiayaoqi) provides introductions to PBS, ePBS, PEPC, and Optimistic Relaying.
- [Tweet-thread](https://twitter.com/jiayaoqi/status/1673574085866192897?t=esRp46DB3O9LizhISO-aAA&s=19) by[YQ](https://twitter.com/jiayaoqi).
## Podcasts & Videos
- [MEV Protection, OFAs, & Uniswap V4 | MEV Decoded Part 2](https://twitter.com/blocknative/status/1673420044615946241?t=OF2yPDH9a0B3-rbWwqWGeQ&s=19) hosted by[Blair Marshall](https://twitter.com/blairlmarshall) from[Blocknative](https://twitter.com/blocknative) discuss how users can get protection from frontrunning through OFAs and more MEV-aware applications with guest[Felix Leupold](https://twitter.com/fleupold_) from[Cow Protocol](https://twitter.com/CoWSwap).
- [What Censorship Resistance Can Do For You](https://twitter.com/specialmech/status/1674894783318478848?t=bAL8iPzYf_Bqo3NE3EHJ7A&s=19) with[Sreeram Kannan](https://twitter.com/sreeramkannan) ([EigenLayer](https://twitter.com/eigenlayer)),[Elijah](https://twitter.com/PossibltyResult) ([Duality Labs](https://twitter.com/dualityxyz)),[Max Resnick](https://twitter.com/MaxResnick1) (SMG) &[Mallesh Pai](https://twitter.com/malleshpai) (SMG) talked about competing definitions of censorship resistance and how the recent paper on[Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions](https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13321).
## Posts & Threads
- [Toni Wahrstätter](https://twitter.com/nero_eth)[posted](https://twitter.com/nero_eth/status/1675777429904797696?t=YcQoBsBt9lDirvCzNjQguA) takeaways on the impact of latency and optimistic relaying in MEV-Boost. The post also introduces 3 new diagrams visualizing optimistic relaying and bid submissions on[mevboost.pics](https://t.co/YZCWSUUPje).
- [Taker](https://twitter.com/0xTaker) [initiated a list](https://twitter.com/0xTaker/status/1677095382885515265?s=20) of repos of people writings strategies on [Artemis](https://t.co/rARV8jjhb9).
## Upcoming events
EthCC[6] is just around the corner, and with the many side events taking place the schedule is packed with MEV-related content. Flashbots will participate in discussions, panels, and events throughout the week. We will also host a series of salons at our Pi-rate ship, more information on these events can be found in our forum post:
**[[WIP] MEV-Week Paris: From Zero Sum To Positive Sum](https://collective.flashbots.net/t/wip-mev-week-paris-from-zero-sum-to-positive-sum/1963)**
To get a comprehensive overview of _all_ the events taking place during the week, make sure to check out our guide:
[**MEV Week Paris**](https://www.notion.so/flashbots/MEV-Week-Paris-6522b2aa9c2f4acabbc648c9965f0751)
### Other events:
- July 12th: [All You Wanna Know About Cross Chain MEV Market](https://twitter.com/EigenPhi/status/1674801860631470080?t=RPO5Cqi6dOE_DBxEWbsfTw&s=19) with [Matt Deible](https://twitter.com/mattdeible) ([ODOS](https://twitter.com/odosprotocol)), [Julian](https://twitter.com/_julianma) (EF: Robust Incentives Group), [Yixin Cao](https://twitter.com/playerYixin) ([EigenPhi](https://twitter.com/EigenPhi)) and [Bridge Baron](https://twitter.com/thebridgebaron) (MEV Searcher) will discuss the opportunities and threats associated with cross-chain MEV, how to design fair markets and how upcoming EIPs may impact cross-chain MEV.
* * *
That’s it for this week! Feel free to share additional resources in the replies below or in the [bookmark-topics](https://collective.flashbots.net/search?q=bookmark%20in%3Atitle)
[Sign up here](https://forms.gle/Qr6MEUkVa13TDipW6) if you wish to receive The MEV Letter straight to your inbox.
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### Author:  [@martriay](https://collective.flashbots.net/u/martriay)
#### Post date: [July 10, 2023, 4:25pm UTC](https://collective.flashbots.net/t/the-mev-letter-0/1967/2 "2023-07-10T16:25:57Z")
> [@Fred](#):
>
> [Sign up here](https://forms.gle/Qr6MEUkVa13TDipW6) if you wish to receive The MEV Letter straight to your inbox.
This seems to be set as private.
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### Author:  [@Fred](https://collective.flashbots.net/u/Fred)
#### Post date: [July 11, 2023, 10:12am UTC](https://collective.flashbots.net/t/the-mev-letter-0/1967/3 "2023-07-11T10:12:48Z")
Fixed!
Thanks for the heads up.