# Latency Races In PBS

**URL:** https://collective.flashbots.net/t/latency-races-in-pbs/2047
**Category:** Research
**Tags:** open-problem, latency, pbs
**Created:** [July 24, 2023, 7:52pm UTC](https://collective.flashbots.net/t/latency-races-in-pbs/2047 "2023-07-24T19:52:51Z")
**Posts on this page:** 1
**Showing post:** 1

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### Author: ![Quintus](https://collective.flashbots.net/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/q/49beb7/32.png) [@Quintus](https://collective.flashbots.net/u/Quintus)
#### Post date: [July 24, 2023, 7:52pm UTC](https://collective.flashbots.net/t/latency-races-in-pbs/2047/1 "2023-07-24T19:52:52Z")

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## Overview

Sensitivity to latency from searchers can have a centralising effect. Currently, latency-sensitive searchers have an incentive to submit traders via integrated builders partly because sending transactions to other builders incurs a latency cost, creating a centralising force on the builder market. Additionally, searchers may prefer landing transactions only via builders which are located in desirable positions, leading to geographical centralisation. **What changes to PBS (or similar interface) can be implemented to reduce this effect?**

## Why Latency Sensitivity

The overarching answer is that there is more information available if you submit at a later date. More concrete examples:

- Statistical arbitrageurs shorten window of uncertainty (between trade submission and knowing the outcome in order to reposition on other domains)
- CEX-DEX trades facing adverse selection from lower-latency bidders. (e.g. if my competitor always bids later than me, they bid higher than me when the price moves favourably and let me win when the price doesn’t)
- Opportunities which show up late. For example, a transaction which causes a liquidation or arbitrage opportunity may show up very close to the block-submission deadline
- Last look bidding: low-latency bidders have the opportunity to react to other public bids, making the last move before the block is chosen.

## Ideas & Initial Directions

- One idea that Flashbots has been toying with is providing fresh oracle information in key infrastructure (“MEV-time oracles”). For example, a builder could offer a price feed for binance price data and searchers would submit bundles which are conditioned on this price feed. This idea requires some expansion:

- Private bidding ([Cryptography](https://collective.flashbots.net/t/private-bidding-in-pbs-cryptography/2031), [Incentives](https://collective.flashbots.net/t/proposer-incentive-compatibility-of-private-bidding-in-pbs/2032))

## Guiding Questions

- What impact would a successful implementation of MEV-time oracles have?
- Can incentive compatibility be achieved for providing up-to-date information at key infrastructure points (builder, proposer)?
- What protocol\<\>MEV-market interface reduces the centralising impact of latency racing the most?

## Relevant links

- [Latency arms race concerns in blockspace markets - Economics - Ethereum Research](https://ethresear.ch/t/latency-arms-race-concerns-in-blockspace-markets/14957)
- [[2306.02179] Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding in Transaction Ordering](https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.02179)
- [[2305.16468] Time to Bribe: Measuring Block Construction Market](https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.16468)
- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYH7n4M016A&t=16838s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYH7n4M016A&t=16838s)

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